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Abstract—Protecting sensitive information from improper
disclosure is a fundamental security goal. It is complicated,
and difficult to achieve, often because of unavoidable or even
unpredictable operating conditions that can lead to breaches in
planned security defences. An attractive approach is to frame
the goal as a quantitative problem, and then to design methods
that measure system vulnerabilities in terms of the amount of
information they leak. A consequence is that the precise operating
conditions, and assumptions about prior knowledge, can play a
crucial role in assessing the severity of any measured vunerability.
We develop this theme by concentrating on vulnerability
measures that are robust in the sense of allowing general leakage
bounds to be placed on a program, bounds that apply whatever
its operating conditions and whatever the prior knowledge might
be. In particular we propose a theory of channel capacity,
generalising the Shannon capacity of information theory, that can
apply both to additive- and to multiplicative forms of a recently-
proposed measure known as g-leakage. Further, we explore the
computational aspects of calculating these (new) capacities: one
of these scenarios can be solved efficiently by expressing it as a
Kantorovich distance, but another turns out to be NP-complete.
We also find capacity bounds for arbitrary correlations with
data not directly accessed by the channel, as in the scenario of
Dalenius’s Desideratum.
Keywords—Quantitative information flow, channel capacity,
confidentiality, Dalenius Desideratum.
I. Introduction
Protecting sensitive information from improper disclosure
is a fundamental security goal, but one that is clearly not
being achieved well in today’s cyber infrastructure. The issue
is complicated by the fact that some leakage of sensitive
information is often unavoidable in practice, due either to
system functionality (e.g. a statistical database must by design
reveal information derived from the database entries, even
if those entries themselves should be confidential) or due
to side-channels (e.g. it is difficult to prevent running time
or power consumption from depending on secrets). For this
reason, it is attractive to approach the problem quantitatively,
and indeed there has been good progress in recent years in the
area of quantitative information flow, including works with a
foundational focus [1]–[11], works aimed at the development
of verification techniques [12]–[19], and works analyzing the
leakage in real-system vulnerabilities [20]–[22].
One important quantitative theme has been the development
of leakage measures with strong operational significance for
confidentiality, so that the amount of information leaked is
associated with the constraints and rewards of real attacks.
In this respect, notable measures include min-entropy leakage
[6] and g-leakage [11]. Assuming that an adversary’s prior
knowledge about the secret is represented as a probability
distribution pi, min-entropy leakage is based on the ratio of
the secret’s posterior- and prior vulnerability to being guessed
correctly in one try by the adversary. One-try vulnerability is
clearly a basic and important measure of confidentiality, but it
should be recognized that it is not appropriate in all situations.
For this reason, g-leakage generalizes vulnerability with a gain
function g that models the operational scenario, allowing us
to consider situations in which the adversary gains e.g. by
guessing the secret partially, approximately, or within k tries.
It can also model scenarios where there is a penalty for making
incorrect guesses.
A second important theme concerns robustness. The leak-
age caused by a channel C depends on both the prior distribu-
tion pi and the particular leakage measure used (e.g. Shannon
entropy, guessing entropy, min-entropy, g-leakage). But what if
we do not know pi, or don’t know the leakage measure, or don’t
know either? Then we might worry that our conclusions about
information leakage lack robustness. Precisely for this reason,
there has been considerable interest in achieving results that
are less sensitive to the particular assumptions made of prior
or entropy-measure. Capacity is the maximum leakage over all
prior distributions—and its utility is that when a channel has
small capacity, its leakage is small, no matter what the prior
may be. It is also interesting to establish capacity relationships
between different leakage measures. For instance, the Miracle
Theorem of [11] shows that min-capacity (the maximum min-
entropy leakage over all priors) is an upper bound on g-leakage
for every gain function g—this means that a channel with small
min-capacity has small g-leakage, no matter what prior or gain
function is used. A second approach to robustness concerns
comparisons between channels. It has recently been shown in
the Coriaceous Theorem of [23] that a channel A never leaks
more than a channel B, on any prior pi and gain function g, if
and only if A secures B in the sense that that A is equivalent
to the combination of B with some “post-processing” R.
This paper builds on these successes of the g-leakage
model, achieving advances in both operational significance and
robustness.
With respect to operational significance, recall that (as
mentioned above) standard g-leakage is based on the ratio
of the posterior and prior g-vulnerabilities. But there are
situations where it seems more significant to consider instead
the difference of the vulnerabilities. For instance, a system
whose prior- and posterior vulnerabilities are 2−1000 and 2−700
respectively has a huge multiplicative increase of 2300, but
its additive increase is less than 2−700, which might well be
considered negligible. Moreover, g-vulnerabilities can be used
to model the economic value to the adversary of the prior-
and posterior situations; here too it seems more significant
to consider their difference rather than their ratio. Finally,
we discover that both guessing-entropy and Shannon-entropy
leakage can be expressed as additive g-leakages. For these
reasons, in this paper we develop the theory of additive g-
leakage, complementing the existing multiplicative theory.
With respect to robustness, this paper presents a systematic
study of g-capacity. Since the g-leakage of a channel C de-
pends on both the prior pi and the gain function g, we consider
several versions of capacity: we can fix g and universally
quantify pi, or we can fix pi and universally quantify g, or
we can universally quantify both pi and g. By considering
both multiplicative- and additive leakage, we get a total of
six capacity scenarios. We also consider a seventh capacity
scenario related to the famous ad-omnia privacy desideratum
proposed by Dalenius [24] for statistical databases, which
states that nothing about an individual should be learnable with
the database that could not equally well have been learned
without it. As shown by Dwork [25], this desideratum is
too strong to be achievable: for any useful database there is
always some prior knowledge the adversary can use to induce
a leakage of information. Analogously, we show here that g-
leakage can quantify the leakage about a secret X caused by an
apparently unrelated channel C from Y to Z when the adversary
knows some correlations between X and Y .
Beyond our systematic study, we make novel and signifi-
cant contributions in four of those seven capacity scenarios:
• Given a prior pi, we show that a gain function gpi max-
imizing the multiplicative leakage can be computed
efficiently. (§VI-B)
• For the specific gain function gid, we show that the
maximum additive leakage over all priors is NP-
complete. (§VII-A)
• Given a prior pi, we show that the maximum additive
leakage over all gain functions can be computed in
linear time, because this leakage can be expressed as
a Kantorovich distance. (§VII-B)
• We show that the “Dalenius” leakage of X caused by
a channel C from Y to Z is bounded by the capacity
of C, regardless of the correlations that may exist
between X and Y . (§IX)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives preliminaries, Section III motivates additive g-leakage,
and Section IV presents useful algebraic properties for gain
functions. Section V then defines the seven capacity scenarios
that we consider. Sections VI and VII present our results on
the multiplicative- and additive scenarios respectively, with
Section VIII giving some examples. Section IX presents our
“Dalenius” bounds, proven using new results about the additive
capacity of channel cascades. Finally, Sections X and XI
discuss related work and conclude.
II. Preliminaries
A. Basic notations
We begin by recalling the basic definitions of information-
theoretic channels [26]. A channel is a triple (X,Y,C) where
X and Y are finite sets (typically of secret input values and
observable output values resp.) and C is an |X|×|Y| channel
matrix whose entries are between 0 and 1 and whose rows each
sum to 1. Typically we use upper-case Roman letters (like C)
for channels, and calligraphic letters (like X,Y) for the sets
over which they operate. We write Cx,y for the element of C
at row x in X and column y in Y. For the (entire) row x we
write Cx,−, and for column y we write C−,y.
The value Cx,y is the conditional probability of output y’s
being produced by C from input x. A channel is deterministic
just when all its elements are either 0 or 1, implying that
each input row contains a single 1 which identifies that input’s
unique corresponding output.
Typically we assume knowledge of a prior distribution pi
on X, using lower-case Greek letters for simple distributions
like that; by analogy with Cx,y indexing a matrix, as above,
we write pix for pi at x, thus the probability that pi gives to
x. For more complex distributions we use upper-case Greek
letters;1 for example the joint distribution on X×Y determined
by input distribution pi and channel C is typically written
Πx,y=pixCx,y; when Π is understood, we can use a Π-implicit
convention to write that as just p(x, y). The jointly distributed
random variables X,Y have marginal probabilities that (again
Π-implicitly) we write p(x)=
∑
y p(x, y) (which of course is
just pix again) and p(y)=
∑
x p(x, y); occasionally we also write
X,Y informally for “the (unnamed) distribution on X,Y ” resp.
The conditional probabilities are then given by p(y|x)=p(x,y)/p(x)
(if p(x) is non-zero) and p(x|y)=p(x,y)/p(y) (if p(y) is non-zero).
Note that Π is the unique joint distribution that recovers pi
and C, in that p(x)=pix and p(y|x)=Cx,y (if p(x) is non-zero).
When necessary to avoid ambiguity, we write these Π-implicit
distributions with subscripts, e.g. pX or pXY or pY .
For example given |X|=3 and |Y|=4, we could consider a
channel C (at left) which, when applied to (the uniform) prior
pi = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) produces the joint matrix Π (at right):
C y1 y2 y3 y4
x1 1 0 0 0
x2 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
x3 1/2 1/3 1/6 0
pi
−→
Π y1 y2 y3 y4
x1 1/3 0 0 0
x2 0 1/6 1/12 1/12
x3 1/6 1/9 1/18 0
(1)
By summing Π’s columns we get the Y-marginal distribution
pY = (1/2, 5/18, 5/36, 1/12), and by normalizing those columns
1Where the upper-case Greek- and Roman letters are the same, we will
write the Greek in sans-serif: thus upper-case τ would be T.
we obtain the four posterior distributions pX|y1 = (2/3, 0, 1/3),
pX|y2 = (0, 3/5, 2/5), pX|y3 = (0, 3/5, 2/5) and pX|y4 = (0, 1, 0).
We use D() to construct the set of distributions on a set,
so that DX is typically the set of distributions on the input
and DY is the set of distributions on the output. For a point-
or equivalently Dirac distribution assigning probability 1 to
some x in X (and thus 0 to all other elements of X) we write
[x]. We write ⌈pi⌉ for the support of distribution pi, that is the
(sub-)set of elements where it is not zero.2 For the sum of a
(sub-)distribution pi we write just Σpi; using that we could write
more succinctly p(x) =
∑
Πx,− and p(y) =
∑
Π−,y.
For the expected value over a distribution pi:DX of some
random variable F:X→R, where R is usually the reals R but
more generally can be a vector space, we write EpiF; thus in the
discrete case we have EpiF =
∑
x pixF(x). If X itself is a vector
space, then we abbreviate Epi(id) by just Epi, the “average” of
the distribution pi on X.
Leakage measures can be defined based on various entropy-
like functions of the prior distribution pi and the posterior
distributions pX|y, together with their probabilities p(y). Here
are some examples.
Shannon leakage is based on the Shannon entropy H[pi] =
−
∑
x pix lg pix [27] of the prior distribution
3 and the expected
Shannon entropy of the posterior distributions H[pi,C] =∑
y p(y)H[pX|y]. It is their difference H[pi]−H[pi,C] that equals
the mutual information I(pi,C).4
Guessing-entropy leakage is based on the guessing entropy
[28] of the prior distribution, that is G[pi] =
∑
i i pixi where the
i-indexing of X is in non-increasing probability order, and on
the expected guessing entropy of the posterior distributions
G[pi,C] =
∑
y p(y)G[pX|y]. The guessing-entropy leakage then
is the difference G[pi] −G[pi,C].
The operational significance of both Shannon- and guessing
entropy can be stated in terms of the expected number of brute-
force guesses an adversary would need to find the secret. 5
Min-entropy leakage [6] is based on the prior vulnerability
V[pi]=maxx pix, the probability of the secret’s being guessed
in one try, and the expected vulnerability of the posterior
distributions V[pi,C] =
∑
y p(y)V[pX|y].
The min-entropy leakage L(pi,C) is the logarithm of the
ratio of the posterior- and prior vulnerabilities:
L(pi,C) = lg(V[pi,C]/V[pi]) . (2)
Note that vulnerability implicitly assumes an operational sce-
nario in which the adversary gains only by guessing the secret
exactly, and in one try.
For this reason, g-leakage [11] generalizes vulnerability to
incorporate a gain function g, the choice of which allows the
modelling of differing operational scenarios. In each scenario,
there will be some set W of guesses that the adversary could
2Note that the characteristic function of the support set is indeed the ceiling
of the distribution as a function.
3We write lg for log2 (Knuth).
4The more usual notation for these quantities is H(X), H(X|Y), and I(X;Y).
We explain at the end of §II why we use brackets [·].
5For Shannon entropy, this follows from a result by Massey [28].
make about the secret, and for any guess w and secret x, there
will be some gain g(w, x) that the adversary gets by having
chosen w when the secret’s actual value was x; gains range
from 0, when choosing w has no value at all, to 1, when w is
ideal. (In §III-A, and Def. 3 in §V this is generalised, however.)
Formally g:W×X→ [0, 1], where W is a finite set. Given
a gain function g, the prior g-vulnerability is defined as the
maximum expected gain over all possible guesses:
Vg[pi] = max
w
∑
x
pixg(w, x) . (3)
The posterior g-vulnerability and the g-leakage are then de-
fined as for min-entropy leakage above, so that we have
Vg[pi,C] =
∑
y
p(y)Vg[pX|y] , (4)
and then Lg(pi,C) = lg(Vg[pi,C]/Vg[pi]) .
Note that the identity gain function gid, which gives gain
1 for guessing the secret correctly and 0 otherwise, makes
g-leakage coincide with min-entropy leakage, which latter is
thus a special case. But gain functions can do much more. As
explained in [11], they can model a wide variety of practical
operational scenarios, including those where the adversary
benefits from guessing a value close to the secret, guessing a
part of the secret, guessing a property of the secret or guessing
the secret within some bounded number of tries. They can also
model scenarios where there is a penalty for incorrect guesses.
We now recall some previous results about capacity. Shan-
non capacity and min-capacity are, respectively, the maximum
Shannon leakage and maximum min-entropy leakage, over all
priors. The min-capacity of C, denoted ML(C), is always
realized on the uniform prior and it is equal to the logarithm
of the sum of the column maximums of C [20], [29]. Min-
capacity is an upper bound on Shannon capacity [11], and
the two coincide on deterministic channels [30]. Finally, the
Miracle Theorem [11] shows that min-capacity is an upper
bound on g-leakage, for every prior pi and gain function g.
B. Hyper-distributions and their notations
A more abstract view of the action of a channel on a prior
(e.g. more abstract than producing a joint distribution) is that
it produces a distribution of posteriors. Following [7], [23], we
call those hyper-distributions, for brevity writing just “hyper”.
A hyper on the input space X is of type D2X. Consider
a prior pi on X and a channel C:X→Y which, as usual,
determines a joint distribution Π:D(X×Y). As above, with
Π understood we have a distribution pY on the outputs and,
for each y, a corresponding posterior distribution pX|y on the
inputs. If instead of considering pY to be a distribution on
Y we consider it to be a distribution on the corresponding
posteriors (i.e. on the normalised columns of Π themselves,
rather than on their Y-labels), then we have a hyper which we
write [pi,C]. For the example at (1) above, that hyper would
assign probabilities (1/2, 15/36, 1/12) to the posteriors (2/3, 0, 1/3),
(0, 3/5, 2/5), and (0, 1, 0), respectively.6
6There might be fewer posteriors in the support of hyper [pi,C] than there
are columns in the joint distribution Π from which it derives, because if several
columns of Π normalise to the same posterior then the hyper will automatically
coalesce them [23]: columns y2 and y3 were coalesced in this case.
Because hyper [pi,C] is of type D2X, that is DV where
V=DX is a vector space, we can just average that hyper itself,
in effect “collapsing” it; and that gives the original prior again.
That is we have the convenient identity E[pi,C] = pi.
A special case of a hyper is the point hyper on a particular
(simple) distribution, say pi: we write that as [pi], as stated
above for point distributions generally and of which this is just
a special case. In this way we can regard g-vulnerability Vg as
acting on hypers in all cases. In particular Vg[pi] viewed this
way, i.e. as a function Vg of type D
2X→R applied to a (point)
hyper, remains equal to maxw
∑
x pixg(w, x) as we defined it
above.
III. Additive Leakage
Additive leakage is the difference between the posterior and
prior vulnerabilities, and we write it
L+g (pi,C) = Vg[pi,C] − Vg[pi] .
Note that the additive version of min-entropy leakage (i.e. with
respect to gid) was considered previously in [29] and [15].
(Standard g-leakage is defined multiplicatively, based on the
ratio of the posterior and prior g-vulnerabilities.7)
We observe that calculating leakage additively rather
than multiplicatively will not have any impact on chan-
nels’ leakage ordering, since the additive leakage or-
dering L+g (pi, A) ≤ L
+
g (pi, B) and its multiplicative version
Lg(pi, A) ≤ Lg(pi, B) are both equivalent to Vg[pi, A] ≤ Vg[pi, B]
(provided that Vg[pi]>0 in the multiplicative case). But we
believe that additive g-leakage is interesting and important in
several respects, explained below.
A. Operational significance
First, there are a number of situations where additive
leakage may have greater operational significance than does
multiplicative leakage. To illustrate, consider a secret array X
of uniformly distributed 10-bit passwords for 1,000 users. The
following probabilistic channel (it is (Ex1) from [11]) reveals
some randomly-chosen user’s password:
u
?
← {0..999};
Y = (u, X[u]);
When analyzed using min-entropy leakage, it leaks 10 bits,
since it increases the vulnerability from 2−10000 to 2−9990,
a factor of 210. But this analysis is inadequate if we are
concerned about the loss of any user’s password, and not just
about the loss of the entire database. Hence [11] defines a gain
function g where
W = {(u, x) | 0 ≤ u ≤ 999 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1023}
and
g((u, x), X) =
{
1, if X[u] = x
0, otherwise.
Note that this g gives the adversary a gain of 1 for correctly
guessing the password of any user. When analyzed using g, the
channel now increases the g-vulnerability from 2−10 to 1. But
7The g-leakage is the logarithm of this ratio, which just changes the scale.
this is again a factor of 210, which means that the g-leakage
is 10 bits, exactly the same as was the min-entropy leakage!
The point is that if we consider only the ratios of the
vulnerabilities, an increase from 2−10000 to 2−9990 is exactly
equivalent to an increase from 2−10 to 1. But, additively, the
former increase is less than 2−9990, a completely negligible
quantity, while the latter is about 0.999, a huge difference.8
Another important motivation for considering additive leak-
age is the possibility of viewing vulnerabilities in economic
terms. That is, we could define a gain function g so that the
prior and posterior vulnerabilities would model the economic
value to the adversary of its prior- and posterior knowledge
about the secret. In this case, the additive leakage would
represent the expected monetary gain from carrying out the
attack represented by the channel C. Since making the attack
might involve costs to the adversary, costs that he can predict,
the additive leakage would then be crucial in his decision of
whether the attack makes sense economically.
A technical issue to be considered concerns the range of
gain functions. In [11], [23], gain functions are required to
return values in the range [0, 1]. Note that in the multiplicative
context, negative vulnerabilities would cause mathematical
problems, and merely allowing a larger range [0, a] would
make no difference. In the additive context, however, it would
make good sense to allow a wider range of gain values—
large values could represent large economic gains, and negative
values could represent losses (as in the gain function gtiger of
[11]).9 We will say more about this issue in Section V below.
B. Expressiveness
Additive leakage is also interesting because some important
existing leakages are special cases of additive g-leakages.
First, we find that we can express guessing entropy as
a negative g-vulnerability. If we let W be the set of all
permutations f of X, we can then define the gain function
g( f , x) = − i
where i is the unique index of x within permutation f , assumed
to range from 1 to n. (Note that this requires extending the
allowed range of gain functions, since g has range in [−n,−1].)
With this definition, we find that Vg[pi] = −G[pi] and Vg[pi,C] =
−G[pi,C], which means that the additive g-leakage is exactly
the guessing-entropy leakage:
L+g (pi,C) = Vg[pi,C]−Vg[pi] = G[pi]−G[pi,C] .
We might of course wonder whether guessing-entropy
leakage could also be expressed as a multiplicative g-leakage,
but we suspect that in general this is not possible.
Finally, we can even express Shannon leakage (mutual
information) as an additive g-leakage, although this does
require further extension.
8On the other hand, increasing vulnerability from 0.000001 to 0.300001 is
far more significant than increasing it from 0.4 to 0.7, even though both give
additive leakage of 0.3. Perhaps we could say, roughly speaking, that leakage
is ‘significant’ only if both the multiplicative- and additive leakage are ‘large’.
9Theorem 4.1 of [11] says that we always have Vg(pi,C) ≥ Vg(pi). It remains
true even if gain values are allowed to be negative, which means that additive
leakage will always be non-negative.
To do this, we let W be the (uncountably infinite) set of
all probability distributions ω on X, and we define g by
g(ω, x) = lgωx .
Since ωx is in [0, 1], this gain function has range [−∞, 0]. The
g-vulnerability associated with this gain function is
Vg[pi] = sup
ω
∑
x
pix lgωx .
It turns out that Vg is realized when ω=pi, thanks to Gibbs’
inequality [31], which implies that Vg[pi] = −H[pi]. This
implies that the additive g-leakage for this g is exactly the
Shannon leakage.
Using continuity arguments, we could restrict to a count-
ably infinite W and a gain function with range (−∞, 0]. Still,
W needs to be infinite and g unbounded in order to capture
Shannon leakage. Although such gain functions are interesting
from the point of view of expressiveness, in this paper we
restrict to finite sets of guesses W.
IV. Gain-function algebra
Using gain functions to analyse leakage properties of chan-
nels can be simplified by establishing some general algebraic
properties. Fix a channel C, prior pi and gain function g. We
define the following special g-functions, for k:R:
g×k(w, x) = g(w, x) × k
g+k(w, x) = g(w, x) + k
g+k@x′ (w, x) = g(w, x) + (k if x=x
′ else 0) .
(5)
(Notice that in this section we are allowing completely unre-
stricted gain functions W×X→ R, for some finite W.)
These new gain functions satisfy the following properties,
which we prove in App. A:
x-Shift Vg+k@x′ [pi,C] = Vg[pi,C] + kpix′
Global Shift Vg+k [pi,C] = Vg[pi,C] + k
Scale Vg×k [pi,C] = k × Vg[pi,C] ,
for k≥0
(6)
In consequence, we have the following invariance results for
leakages, simple corollaries of the above equalities:
Lemma 1: Scaling invariance For fixed gain function
g and channel C, multiplicative leakage is invariant under
positive Scale.
Lemma 2: Shifting invariance For fixed gain function g
and channel C, additive leakage is invariant under Shift (of
either kind).
V. Channel capacity
Shannon’s original definition of channel capacity uses
mutual information as the measure of information flow and
maximises over all priors. The classic significance of the value
obtained is that it provides a tight bound on the amount of
information that can be transmitted reliably over the channel.
In the security context, we look instead for bounds that tell
us something about the “level of secrecy” of information,
formulated for us in terms of relative (multiplicative) or
comparative (additive) increases in g-vulnerability.
A useful notion of g-capacity would provide a robust
measure of leakage that allowed meaningful predictions about
how an attacker could use the channel for his gain. For
robustness, we can consider universally quantifying over the
prior pi, over the gain function g, or over both. In quantifying
over the prior pi we are acknowledging that, in many situations,
the prior is unknown and the assumption that it is uniform is
not reasonable. (For example, large-scale studies have shown
that password selection is not at all uniform [32].) In quan-
tifying over the gain function g we are acknowledging that
we might not know the value to the adversary of different
sorts of partial information about the secret, neither now nor
even in the future. (In medical research, for instance, new
correlations between diet and susceptibility to disease are
constantly discovered: although knowing someone’s favorite
dish might be relatively harmless today, it might not be so in
the future.)
Since we can universally quantify over the prior pi, over
the gain function g, or over both, and since we are interested
in both multiplicative- and additive g-leakage, we arrive at a
total of six scenarios, which we write as follows:
Lg(∀,C),L∀(pi,C),L∀(∀,C),L
+
g (∀,C),L
+
∀(pi,C),L
+
∀(∀,C).
Each of them is of independent interest, and we define them
precisely below.
For those scenarios that quantify over the gain function g,
a first issue to be resolved is the set of gain functions that we
allow. In previous work [11], [23], a gain function is required
to have type W×X → [0, 1] for some finite set W. But, as
motivated in Section III, with additive leakage we may wish to
allow gain functions with a range different from [0, 1]. Can we
find a suitable set of gain functions to use in both multiplicative
and additive g-capacity?
Note first that negative gain values are mathematically
problematic for multiplicative leakage. But they are inessential
for additive leakage, since negative gain values can be elim-
inated by shifting (g is bounded since W is assumed finite),
with no effect on additive leakage (Lemma 2). We therefore
restrict our attention to non-negative gain functions.
Next consider an unbounded range [0,∞). Note that al-
though any individual g is bounded (since W is finite), still
an unbounded range allows to choose arbitrarily large gain
functions when quantifying over them. For the multiplicative
case this makes no difference, since any g (since it’s bounded)
can be scaled down to [0, 1] without affecting the leakage
(Lemma 2). On the other hand, scaling does affect the additive
leakage, and the unbounded range of g can cause the additive
capacities L+
∀
(pi,C), L+
∀
(∀,C) to be ill defined. Instead of
bounding the range of g, we adopt the more permissive and
mathematically attractive approach (for reasons explained in
§VII) to restrict to 1-spanning gain functions, whose gain
values, for a given guess w, span a range of size at most 1:
Definition 3: 1-spanning A gain function g is 1-
spanning if |g(w, x) − g(w, x′)| ≤ 1 for all x, x′:X,w:W. 
We write G1X to denote the set of non-negative, 1-spanning
gain functions on X. When we formally define the different g-
capacities below, this is the set of gain functions that we allow.
Note that bounded range [0, k] gain functions are a special
case: they are scalar multiples of 1-spanning gain functions.
A. Multiplicative capacities defined
Recall that DX is the set of distributions over a finite
(and fixed) space of secrets X. Both priors pi and posterior
distributions are elements of DX.
1) Fixed g, universally quantified pi — Lg(∀,C):
Definition 4: Multiplicative g-capacity For channel C
and gain function g, the multiplicative g-capacity is given by
Lg(∀,C) = sup
pi:DX
Lg(pi,C) = sup
pi:DX
lg(Vg[pi,C]/Vg[pi]) .

2) Universally quantified g, fixed pi — L∀(pi,C):
Definition 5: Multiplicative pi-capacity For channel C
and prior pi, the multiplicative pi-capacity is given by
L∀(pi,C) = sup
g:G1X
Lg(pi,C) = sup
g:G1X
lg(Vg[pi,C]/Vg[pi]) .

It is worth pointing out that quantifying over gain functions
in G1X is exactly equivalent here (in the multiplicative case)
to quantifying over gain functions with range [0, 1] (as used
in previous work). First, gain functions with range [0, 1] are in
G
1X. Second, any g:G1X can be scaled to have range [0, 1],
with no effect on the multiplicative leakage.
3) Universally quantified g and pi — L∀(∀,C):
Definition 6: Multiplicative capacity For channel C the
general multiplicative capacity is given by
L∀(∀,C) = sup
g:G1X
Lg(∀,C) = sup
pi:DX
L∀(pi,C) .

B. Additive capacities defined
1) Fixed g, universally quantified pi — L+g (∀,C):
Definition 7: Additive g-capacity For channel C and
gain function g, the additive g-capacity is given by
L+g (∀,C) = sup
pi:DX
L+g (pi,C) = sup
pi:DX
Vg[pi,C]− Vg[pi] .

This generalises Shannon capacity, but with Shannon en-
tropy replaced by some g-vulnerability.
2) Universally quantified g, fixed pi — L+
∀
(pi,C):
Definition 8: Additive pi-capacity For channel C and
prior pi, the additive pi-capacity is given by
L+∀(pi,C) = sup
g:G1X
L+g (pi,C) = sup
g:G1X
Vg[pi,C]−Vg[pi] .

As mentioned above, restricting gain functions to G1X does
make a difference in additive leakage. But note that a gain
function with arbitrary range can always be expressed as a
gain function in G1X followed by some shifting (which has
no effect on the additive leakage) and scaling (which multiplies
the additive leakage by a constant k). Hence we can, if desired,
simply scale L+
∀
(pi,C) to account for a larger class of gain
functions.
3) Universally quantified g and pi — L+
∀
(∀,C):
Definition 9: Additive capacity For channel C the gen-
eral additive capacity is given by
L+∀(∀,C) = sup
g:G1X
L+g (∀,C) = sup
pi:DX
L+∀(pi,C) .

C. A capacity scenario related to Dalenius’s Desideratum
In addition to the six capacity scenarios considered above,
we can also identify a seventh scenario that is considerably
more “open ended”.
In the context of differential privacy [25], [33], a major
motivation is the possibility that the adversary knows inter-
esting correlations among secrets. Recall Dwork’s argument
for the impossibility of Dalenius’s Desideratum—she imagines
the prior knowledge “Alan Turing is two inches taller than the
average Lithuanian woman.” With such knowledge, revealing
information about Lithuanian women has the surprising effect
of revealing information about Alan Turing.
And indeed we can consider such scenarios in the context
of g-leakage. Suppose we have a secret X with prior pi, and an
adversary interested only in learning about X, as measured by a
gain function g :W×X → R. Now imagine a channel C from
Y to Z, apparently having nothing at all to do with X. But still
the adversary might know some interesting correlation between
X and Y , expressed as a joint distribution Π on X×Y (which
must induce marginal distribution pi on X). In this case, we
can quantify how much C (surprisingly) teaches the adversary
about X. For we can extend C to a channel C∗ from (X,Y) to
Z, defined by C∗
(x,y),z
= Cy,z. (Note that C
∗ ignores the value of
X.) And we can extend gain function g to a gain function g∗
for (X,Y), defined by g∗(w, (x, y)) = g(w, x); this reflects the
fact that the adversary cares only about X. With this done, we
find that Lg∗ (Π,C
∗) tells how much channel C leaks about X,
given knowledge of correlations Π.
Note here that Vg∗ [Π] = Vg[pi], but Vg∗ [Π,C
∗] could be
much larger. This means that the adversary’s knowledge of the
correlations Π between X and Y does not immediately teach
him anything new about X. It is only observing the output of
C∗ that gives him new information about X—and this in spite
of the fact that channel C∗ completely ignores the value of X.
Hence it would be especially significant to establish upper
bounds on the capacity (whether additive or multiplicative) on
C∗ in terms of the capacity of C—such bounds would give us
a way to limit the harm that channel C could cause to X, no
matter what correlations might subsequently be discovered to
exist between X and Y . We give such bounds in Corollaries 22
and 23 in §IX below.
VI. Calculating multiplicative capacities
We now consider the efficiency of calculating capacities in
our three multiplicative scenarios.
A. Fixed g, universally quantified pi — Lg(∀,C)
This scenario appears quite challenging. For the identity
gain function gid (i.e. min-entropy leakage), we know from
[20], [29] that a uniform prior always realizes the capacity.
But this is not true in general. In [11, §V-D] are a channel and
gain function whose multiplicative leakage is not maximized
by a uniform prior but instead by pi = (1/2, 1/2, 0). It is unclear
whether there is an efficient algorithm in this case.
B. Universally quantified g, fixed pi — L∀(pi,C)
Here we have discovered a complete solution:
Theorem 10: For any full-support pi, there exists a gain
function gpi such that for any C we have Lgpi (pi,C) =ML(C).
(As a consequence, Lgpi (pi,C) = L∀(pi,C) since, by the Miracle
Theorem of [11], we have ML(C) = L∀(∀,C).)
Proof: Let gpi:X×X→ [0, 1] be given by
gpi(x, x
′) =
{
a/pix if x=x
′
0 otherwise,
(7)
where a = minx pix. Note that gpi is independent of C; it can be
written as a diagonal matrix whose entries are the reciprocals
of the entries of pi, normalized to be in [0, 1]. Intuitively, gpi
cancels out the “hints” coming from a skewed prior, making
every element of X equally good a priori.
Now straightforward calculations show that Vgpi [pi] = a and
Vgpi [pi,C] = a
∑
ymaxxCx,y, giving Lgpi (pi,C) = lg
∑
ymaxxCx,y.
The latter is the logarithm of the sum of the column maximums
of C, which is ML(C) by the theorem of [20], [29].
As an example, consider the imperfect cancer test from
[30], with channel matrix
C positive negative
cancer 0.90 0.10
no cancer 0.07 0.93
For prior pi = (1/125, 124/125) the min-entropy leakage is 0, since
the best guess is “no cancer”, regardless of the test result. But
with gain function
gpi cancer no cancer
cancer 1 0
no cancer 0 1/124
.
we find that the gpi-leakage is log 1.83 =ML(C).
Finally, note that if pi is not full support, we can just delete
the rows of C corresponding to values of X not in the support.
C. Universally quantified g and pi — L∀(∀,C)
Here we also have a complete solution. By the Miracle
Theorem, multiplicative leakage is maximized by gid and the
uniform pi, which give the min-capacity L∀(∀,C). In fact, by
§VI-B we can let pi be any full-support prior and let g be the
“reciprocals of pi” gain function gpi.
VII. Calculating additive capacities
We now consider the efficiency of calculating capacities in
our three additive scenarios.
A. Fixed g, universally quantified pi — L+g (∀,C)
Here we know a number of interesting things. For gid
(which gives additive min-entropy leakage), it is shown in
[29] that the additive leakage is maximized by some “corner
point” distribution, i.e. one that is uniform on some subset of
X. If |X|=n, there are 2n−1 corner-point distributions, making
the maximum additive leakage computable. But, because the
number of corner-point distributions is exponential in the
size of C, this does not give an efficient algorithm. And the
following theorem shows that an efficient algorithm probably
does not exist: it is NP-complete to decide whether C’s additive
gid-capacity exceeds a given threshold.
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Theorem 11: Given a channel matrix C and a threshold
t, it is NP-complete to decide whether L+gid (∀,C) ≥ t.
Proof: Before beginning the proof, we establish some
basic properties and notation for corner-point distributions.
Given a non-empty subset S of X, the corner-point distribution
piS gives probability 1
|S|
to the values in S and (therefore) gives
probability 0 to the values in X−S. Now observe that
L+gid (pi
S,C)
= V[piS,C] − V[piS] “gid gives ordinary vulnerability”
=
∑
y:Ymaxx:X pi
S
xCx,y −maxx′:X pi
S
x′
=
∑
y:Ymaxx:S
1
|S|
Cx,y −
1
|S|
= 1
|S|
(
∑
y:Ymaxx:SCx,y − 1) .
Notice that
∑
y:Ymaxx:SCx,y is simply the sum of the column
maximums of C, restricted to the rows in S. To simplify
notation we let σS abbreviate this sum, allowing us to write
L+gid (pi
S,C) =
σS − 1
|S|
. (8)
Now we proceed with the proof. By the result in [29], it is
easy to see that the decision problem “L+gid (∀,C) ≥ t ?” is in
NP. For we can simply guess a non-empty subset S and verify
that L+gid (pi
S,C) ≥ t.
We complete the NP-completeness proof by showing a
reduction from the Set-Packing problem [SP3] of [34], which
is the problem of deciding whether a collection of sets U =
{U1, . . . ,Un} contains k pairwise disjoint sets.
Suppose that the elements of the Ui are drawn from
universe {a1, . . . , am}. We begin our reduction by constructing
an n × m channel matrix11 CU where
CUi, j =
{
1
|Ui |
if a j ∈ Ui
0 otherwise.
Now notice that if U contains k pairwise disjoint sets, k ≥ 1,
then CU contains k pairwise non-overlapping rows. This means
that CU is a perfect channel on the corresponding k inputs,
since any possible output from those inputs will uniquely deter-
mine the input. Hence the additive leakage on the corner-point
10It is worth noting that this theorem is fundamentally different from
the intractability results of [18]—those results assume that the channel is
represented as a program, which inevitably leads to intractability of analysis.
In contrast, our theorem is based on the channel matrix, which gives the
channel’s behaviour explicitly.
11Note that if ∅ ∈ U, we do not actually get a channel matrix, since ∅ leads
to an all-zero row. But in this case notice that U contains k pairwise disjoint
sets iff U−{∅} contains k−1 pairwise disjoint sets.
distribution on those k inputs is k−1
k
, since the vulnerability is
increased from 1
k
to 1.
We can see this more formally from equation (8) above.
For if we let S be a set consisting of the indices of k pairwise
disjoint sets in U, then we have
L+gid (pi
S,CU) =
σS − 1
k
where σS is the sum of the column maximums of C
U ,
restricted to the rows in S. But, since the rows in S are non-
overlapping, we know that each nonzero entry in each of these
rows is the only nonzero entry in its column (restricted to the
rows in S), and hence is included in the sum σS. So, since
each row sums to 1, we get that σS = k, which gives
L+gid (pi
S,CU) =
k − 1
k
.
So far we have shown that if U contains k pairwise
disjoint sets, then we have L+gid (∀,C
U) ≥ k−1
k
. But does the
converse hold? Not necessarily, as shown by the following
counterexample:
CU =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0
1
4
0 0 0 1
4
1
4
1
4
 .
In this case,U does not contain 2 disjoint sets, but nevertheless
L+gid (∀,C
U) ≥ 2−1
2
= 1
2
, since the corner-point distribution on
all 3 rows gives additive leakage of 1
3
( 5
2
− 1) = 1
2
.
To correct this difficulty, we need to convert U into a
channel matrix in a slightly more complicated way, one which
boosts the “penalty” for including an overlapping row in a
corner-point distribution.
To this end, let p ≥ 1 be the maximum cardinality of any
of the sets in U.12 Let CU be embedded into a block matrix
CU with p new rows and p new columns:
CU =
Ip×p 0p×m
0n×p C
U
(Here I denotes the identity matrix, and 0 a zero matrix.)
Extending our previous calculation, note that if U contains
k pairwise disjoint sets, then we have
L+gid (∀,C
U) ≥
p + k − 1
p + k
,
since the p new rows are all non-overlapping.
But we can now argue that the converse also holds. For if
L+gid (∀,C
U) ≥
p+k−1
p+k
, then there exists a set S of indices such
that L+gid (pi
S,CU) ≥
p+k−1
p+k
. Assume further that we choose S of
minimum size that can achieve this additive-leakage threshold.
Then we can argue by contradiction that the rows in S must
be nonoverlapping, because if S contains a row that overlaps
some other row of S, then we can delete it without decreasing
the additive leakage.
12In fact, the Set-Packing problem remains NP-complete even if all sets in
U have cardinality at most 3 [34, p. 221].
For suppose that |S| = s for s ≥ 2, and that S′ is formed
by deleting a row with some overlap with the other rows of
S. Recall that
L+gid (pi
S,CU) =
σS − 1
s
,
where σS is the sum of the column maximums of CU ,
restricted to the rows in S. Now observe that when we pass
from S to S′, we lose the contribution to σS from the deleted
row; this loss is at most
p−1
p
, since the deleted row must have
overlap of at least 1
p
with the other rows of S. Hence we have
L+gid (pi
S′ ,CU)
= (σS′ − 1)/(s − 1)
≥ (σS −
p−1
p
− 1)/(s − 1)
≥ (σS −
p+k−1
p+k
− 1)/(s − 1) “k ≥ 0”
≥ (σS −
σS−1
s
− 1)/(s − 1) “L+gid (pi
S,CU) ≥
p+k−1
p+k
”
= (
(σS−1)(s−1)
s
)/(s − 1)
= (σS − 1)/s
= L+gid (pi
S,CU) .
Having proved that the rows in S are nonoverlapping, we
now note that S must contain at least p+k rows, since a
nonoverlapping set of size u gives additive leakage u−1
u
, which
is less than
p+k−1
p+k
unless u ≥ p+k. And, finally, at least k of
the nonoverlapping rows must come from CU , which implies
that U contains k pairwise disjoint sets.
We have thus shown thatU contains k pairwise disjoint sets
iff L+gid (∀,C
U) ≥
p+k−1
p+k
. Hence indeed Set Packing polynomial-
time reduces to Maximum Additive Leakage.
Given the result for gid specifically, we cannot of course
expect the problem to be efficiently solvable for g in general.
But we observe that we can use the linear-programming-based
algorithm for Problem 6.1 of [11] to find a maximizing pi: given
channels C1 and C2, that algorithm finds a pi that maximizes
Vg[pi,C1] − Vg[pi,C2]. (It is aimed at testing whether C1’s g-
leakage can ever exceed C2’s.) Here we can just let C1 be C and
let C2 be O, where O is a channel with just one column,
13 so
that it satisfies noninterference, giving Vg[pi,O]=Vg[pi]. Hence
we get Vg[pi,C1]−Vg[pi,C2] = Vg[pi,C]−Vg[pi] = L
+
g (pi,C).
To use linear programming, the algorithm in [11] applies
a strategy-based formulation of posterior g-vulnerability. A
strategy S reifies the choice of best guess as a channel from Y
(the set of outputs of C) to W (the set of allowable guesses).
We see then that we can formulate posterior vulnerability as
Vg[pi,C] = max
S
∑
x,y,w
pixCx,yS y,wg(w, x) .
But notice that if we then try to compute the maximization
max
pi
(Vg[pi,C1] − Vg[pi,C2]) ,
we have nested maxes and a quadratic objective function, since
the entries of both pi and S are variables.
However, we can assume without loss of generality that
the strategy S is deterministic, which allows the algorithm
13We write O because it is a right-zero of channel cascading.
to try explicitly all strategies S 1 for C1 and S 2 for C2,
adding linear constraints to express that pi is a prior for which
S 1 and S 2 are optimal. In this way, it is able to find a pi
that maximizes additive g-leakage by solving |W||Y|+1 linear-
programming problems. Of course, solving exponentially many
linear-programming problems is not going to be feasible,
except on very small channels.
But it appears that we can reformulate our problem as
a single Quadratic-Programming problem, where the objec-
tive function is quadratic but the constraints are still linear.
Quadratic programming cannot be solved efficiently in general,
but there exist many mature quadratic-programming tools, and
it appears likely that these could be applied fruitfully to the
computation of L+g (∀,C).
B. Universally quantified g, fixed pi — L+
∀
(pi,C)
We next study the complexity of calculating L+
∀
(pi,C). A
first observation is that we can use the linear-programming-
based algorithm for Problem 6.2 of [11] to find a maximizing
g. This algorithm, very similar to the one described just above
in §VII-A, requires the solution of exponentially many linear-
programming problems.
But we find that we can do far better by exploiting some
abstract mathematics. We show here that the quantification
over G1X can be eliminated, because L+
∀
(pi,C) reduces to the
well-known Kantorovich distance [35] between [pi] and [pi,C].
Remarkably, this insight enables us to compute L+
∀
(pi,C) in
time linear in the size of C.
We begin by recalling the Kantorovich distance between
discrete probability distributions, and then we show how it
applies in this context. Given a discrete probability distribution
α:DA and random variable F recall that we write EαF for the
expected value of F:A→R over α. Observe that when α is a
point distribution centred at a that EαF = F(a).
Definition 12: Kantorovich Construction Let d:A×A→
R be a metric on A. We write (DA, d) for the probability
space on A determined by the sigma algebra generated by the
open sets on A. Given two discrete distributions α, α′:DA,
the Kantorovich distance between them is
KDA(α, α
′) = sup
F:L1A
| EαF − Eα′F| ,
where L1A is the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on A [35]. 
The distance KDA(α, α
′) on distributions is again a metric,
and can be used via Def. 12 to construct (D2A,KDA(α, α
′))
[36]. In our context Def. 12 gives equivalent Kantorovich
presentations for DX and D2X, allowing us to access very
general calculational tools for evaluating channel capacities.
In our setting we start with the discrete metric on X
to distinguish secrets because it simply treats all secrets as
distinct. With this view we can use Def. 12 to derive the
space of probability distributions over DX together with an
associated metric on DX. The next lemma recalls however
that this derived metric in fact turns out to be (half of) the
well-known Manhattan metric [37]. (See App. B.)
Lemma 13: Discrete Kantorovich metric Let d:X×X→
R on X be the discrete metric, i.e. such that d(x1, x2) is 0 or
1 according to x1=x2. Then KDX(pi, pi
′) is half the Manhattan
metric on DX: that is
KDX(pi, pi
′) =
1
2
∑
x
| pi′x−pix|
We next use the Manhattan metric to generate the probabil-
ity space for D2X, together with its associated Kantorovich dis-
tance between hypers. Our first observation is that by regarding
Vg as a 1-Lipschitz function on DX, we immediately obtain
that L+
∀
(pi,C) is well-defined. In particular the connection
between leakage calculations and expected values is given by
the equality Vg[pi,C] = E[pi,C]Vg, a technical result that we
prove in App. A as Lem. 24.
Lemma 14: Well defined capacity L+
∀
(pi,C) is well-
defined, and satisfies L+
∀
(pi,C) ≤ KD2X([pi], [pi,C]).
Proof: For any (1-spanning) g:G1X, the gain-function
test Vg regarded as a function from DX → R, which takes
a distribution pi:DX and maps it to Vg[pi], is a 1-Lipschitz
function (Lem. 26 of App. A). This implies from Def. 12
that L+
∀
(pi,C) can be no more than the Kantorovich distance
between [pi] and [pi,C].
An important property of the Kantorovich distance between
probability distributions is that it has a dual formulation
as the Wasserstein metric, commonly known as the “earth-
moving metric” [35]; this in particular gives access to efficient
algorithms for computing it, and strengthening the upper bound
in Lem. 14. Earth moving formalises the idea of measuring the
cost of transforming one distribution into another; it uses the
underlying Kantorovich distance to define the cost function,
which is then averaged over a strategy for re-distributing the
probability mass in the resulting transformation. The earth-
moving distance is defined by the minimum such cost.
We specialise the Wasserstein metric to the case of a
discrete distribution on a set D, with some metric d:D2→R.
Definition 15: The earth-moving metric on DD Con-
sider two distributions σ, τ:DD with σ the “source” distri-
bution and τ the “target” distribution. Then an earth-moving
strategy on DD is a (joint) distribution in D(D2) whose two
marginals are σ and τ. Write Sσ,τ for the set of such strategies.
The earth-moving distance between σ and τ is then the
infimum over all such strategies S :Sσ,τ of ES d. Informally it
is the least sum of products “amount of earth moved” times
“distance moved”. More precisely we define
WDD(σ, τ) = inf
S :Sσ,τ
ES d .

Now we specialise the Wasserstein distance to the same
domain as our definition Def. 15 of the Kantorovich distance,
that is taking D to be DX, so that DD becomes D2X, and the
metric d on DX is half the Manhattan distance. Thus σ, τ:DD
become hypers in D2X and, furthermore, those hypers have
finite support (since we are only considering finite channels).
That means that the strategies S considered in Def. 15 can
also be limited to discrete distributions for our purposes.
That done, we conclude that the two metrics are the same:
Theorem 16: Kantorovich-Rubinstein [35] The Kan-
torovich distance and the earth-moving distance between hy-
pers are the same.
Thm. 16 applied here will allow us to show that channel
capacities are in fact the same as Kantorovich distances
between the prior, considered as a point hyper in D2X, and
the hyper produced by the channel acting on that prior.
Theorem 17: Additive pi-capacity as Kantorovich distance
Let C:X→Y be a channel and pi a prior on X. Then the channel
capacity of C at pi is equal to the Kantorovich distance between
the hypers [pi] and [pi,C]. That is, we have
L+∀(pi,C) = WD2X([pi], [pi,C]) = KD2X([pi], [pi,C]) .
(Note that the second equality is immediate from Thm. 16.)
Proof: Adopt the notation of Def. 15 so that our source
distribution is the point hyper Σ=[pi] and our target is T=[pi,C],
where we are using capital letters here (instead of σ, τ as
earlier) to remind us that the source and target are hypers.
Because Σ is a point distribution (centred on the prior
pi), there is only one strategy in SΣ,T that has the appropri-
ate marginals Σ=[pi] and T=[pi,C]. Given any two marginals
Σ,T with Σ being a point distribution, the set SΣ,T of all
joint distributions with the given marginals Σ,T contains only
one member: any discrete joint distribution whose left (say)
marginal is 1 at some x and zero elsewhere is expressible as
a matrix where only the x-row is non-zero — and that row is
the right marginal exactly. Put informally, if there is only one
source “pile of earth,” then any earth in any target pile can
have come only from that single source.
For general σ, τ:DX the optimal strategy is given by
S σ,τ = Tτ if σ=pi else 0 , (9)
so that all earth transfers from ⌈Σ⌉ start from pi; and the
proportion of earth “at pi” that is moved to any posterior τ
in ⌈T⌉ is the probability [pi,C]τ (= Tτ) that the hyper [pi,C]
assigns to that τ.
Thus we calculate
WD2X([pi], [pi,C])
= minS :SΣ,T ES d “d is underlying metric; Def. 15”
= ES d “take unique S in S as at (9)”
= E[pi,C]dpi “define dσ(τ) = d(σ, τ) to allow Currying;
S at (9) has point left-marginal [pi]”
= Vg[pi,C] − 1 “define g so that Vg[τ] = dpi(τ)+1; see below”
= Vg[pi,C] − Vg[pi] “Vg[pi] = dpi(pi)+1 = 1”
≤ L+
∀
(pi,C) “Def. 8”
≤ KD2X([pi], [pi,C]) , “Lem. 14”
whence the result follows because we have sandwiched
L+
∀
(pi,C) between WD2X([pi], [pi,C]) and KD2X([pi], [pi,C]) —
which from Thm. 16 are equal.
For the “see below” we exhibit a W together with a non-
negative and 1-spanning gain function g:W×X→R such that
Vg[τ] = d(pi, τ)+1. To do this we observe that
d(pi, τ) + 1
= KDX(pi, τ) + 1 “definition d”
=
∑
x |τx−pix|/2 + 1 “Lem. 13”
= maxw
∑
x(τx−pix)w(x)/2 + 1 “define W = X→{−1, 1}”
= maxw
∑
x τxg(w, x) “define g(w, x) =
1 + (w(x) +
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′))/2; see App. C”
= Vg[τ] . “definition Vg for this W”
We now have
E[pi,C]dpi = E[pi,C](Vg−1) = (E[pi,C]Vg) − 1 = Vg[pi,C] − 1 ,
where the last equality follows from Lem. 24 of App. A. We
note that g is at least zero, since [w(x) +
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′)]/2 has
minimum value at least −1, and finally g is 1-spanning since
|g(w, x) − g(w, x′)| = |w(x) − w(x′)|/2 ≤ 1 .
We can now compute L+
∀
(pi,C) efficiently.
Corollary 18: Efficient calculation of additive capacity
Given channel C:X→Y and prior pi:DX, the additive capacity
L+
∀
(pi,C) has complexity O(|X||Y|).
Proof: From Thm. 17 we have the equality L+
∀
(pi,C) =
WD2X([pi], [pi,C]), whose rhs. is the optimal cost of earth-
moving [pi] to [pi,C]. In the proof of that theorem we see
that the cost is the expected value of the Kantorovich distance
between prior pi and the posteriors pX|y in [pi,C] (i.e. E[pi,C]dpi).
That is, the optimal earth-move is calculated from the Y-
marginal pY of the joint distribution Π generated from pi and
C, using the Manhattan distance (Lem. 13) between pi and each
posterior pX|y. Thus the computational cost is given by the cost
of computing the Y-marginal plus the cost of computing the
average Manhattan distance, if we know the marginal.
Computing the Y-marginal takes |X||Y| time and, once
done, computing each pX|y takes |X| time. Similarly, computing
the Manhattan distance between each pi and pX|y takes |X| time.
Finally the cost of computing the expected optimal earth move
takes |X||Y| time, giving a total overall complexity of O(|X||Y|).
C. Universally quantified g and pi — L+
∀
(∀,C)
For additive capacity (unlike multiplicative), it is not the
case that the prior that optimises the capacity is known (or
that it can be easily calculated). Nevertheless, we have made
some progress: thanks to Thm. 17 we can remove one level
of quantification over the gain functions, still leaving an
optimisation problem for computing the capacity but it is less
complex than before. Let C:X→Y be a channel. We can
reformulate Def. 9 as follows:
suppiL
+
∀
(pi,C)
= suppi KD2X([pi], [pi,C]) “Thm. 17”
= suppi
∑
y,x pix|Cxy −
∑
x′ Cx′ypix′ |/2 . “Def. 15; see App. B”
This has the form of an optimisation over variables pix
constrained by pix≥0 and
∑
x pix = 1. The O(|X||Y|) occurrences
of absolute value seem potentially to make the calculation
more complicated in general than e.g. a quadratic optimisation.
VIII. Example calculations
Here are some examples of the techniques of Section VII.
A. Additive capacity, fixed g — L+g (∀,C)
Let channel C and gain function g be
C y1 y2 y3
x1 0.9 0.1 0
x2 0.1 0.7 0.2
x3 0.1 0.5 0.4
g x1 x2 x3
w1 0.7 0.1 0.4
w2 0.1 0.4 0.9
On this example, the algorithm described in §VII-A needs to
solve |W||Y|+1 = 24 = 16 linear programming problems. It
finds that L+g (∀,C) = 12/55, realized on prior pi = (5/11, 0, 6/11).
Using gid, in contrast, the algorithm needs to solve 3
4 = 81
linear programming problems, and it finds that L+gid (∀,C) =
2/5,
realized on prior pi = (1/2, 1/2, 0).
B. Additive capacity, fixed pi — L+
∀
(pi,C)
Cor. 18 and Thm. 17 provide two equivalent ways to cal-
culate L+
∀
(pi,C), which we illustrate using the cancer channel.
Given general prior pi such that pix1 = a and pix2 = 1−a,
we use Cor. 18 to calculate L+
∀
(pi,C) using the expected
earth moving metric as follows. We calculate first the Y
marginal probabilities: the chance of observing a positive
result is a×0.9 + (1−a) × 0.07 = 0.07+0.83a, and for nega-
tive result it is 0.93−0.83a. The corresponding posterior for
observing a positive result, which we denote νp, is given by
ν
p
x1 = 0.9a/(0.07+0.83a) and ν
p
x2 = 0.07(1−a)/(0.07+0.83a).
There is a similar calculation for the negative posterior νn.
Next Cor. 18 directs us to calculate the Manhattan distance
between pi and νp and pi and νn, and then to take the ex-
pected value over the above marginal. The distance between
pi and νp is (|a−ν
p
x1 | + |(1−a)−ν
p
x2 |)/2, which simplifies to
0.83a(1−a)/(0.07+0.83a). Similarly the distance between pi
and νn is 0.83a(1−a)/(0.93−0.83a). Finally taking the expected
move we obtain 2 × 0.83a(1−a) = 1.66a(1−a). For the prior
with a = 1
125
this is approximately 0.0132.
An alternative but equivalent way to calculate L+
∀
(pi,C) is
given in the proof of Thm. 17, where we construct an opti-
mising gain function that achieves additive capacity. Working
through the definitions for this example we see thatW is given
by the four functions X→{−1, 1}. For each such function we
construct g(w, x) = [w(x)−
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′)]/2+1. Two of the four
possibilities result in constants for g(w, x) (e.g. assigning 1
everywhere as x varies), and this corresponds to an overall
additive leakage of 0. Hence only two functions from W
correspond to options that participate in maximising over all
leakage calculations. One maps x1 to 1 and x2 to −1, and the
other is its “reflection” (multiply by −1). For the first, we see
that g(w, x1) = 2−a, and g(w, x2) = 1−a. We summarise the
situation by the following matrix:
g cancer no cancer
don’t treat a a+1
treat 2−a 1−a
One possible operational interpretation for this gain func-
tion is as follows. The result of the cancer test provides
information for the health practitioner and the patient in order
to make an informed decision about the best treatment plan.
In this case the plan would normally consist of whether to
recommend some form of direct medical intervention. The two
gain strategies can therefore be thought of as putting a “cost”
on either treating, or not treating the patient; that cost has
either a high- or low gain for the patient depending on whether
cancer is actually present. In the scenario where the patient
is given direct medical intervention (row labelled “treat” in
the matrix) there is therefore a strong positive gain for the
patient who does have cancer, but relatively a low gain for
the patient who does not have cancer but is given treatment
anyway. Similarly in the scenario corresponding to deciding
not to intervene (row labelled “don’t treat”), there is a relatively
low gain for the patient who does have cancer, but a positive
gain for the patient who does not. With this interpretation,
the additive capacity of 1.66a(1−a) gives the expected overall
gain for the patient, and corresponds to the strategy of always
offering treatment whenever the test is positive, but never when
the test is negative.
We note that this gain function is 1-spanning and non-
negative; in a more realistic costing the difference between
treating and not-treating would be obtained by shifting and
scaling (see §IV), with the former having the option to assign
negative gains in the case of no treatment being given when
in fact the cancer is present.
C. General additive capacity — L+
∀
(∀,C)
Computing the general additive capacity L+
∀
(∀,C) involves
solving the optimisation problem set out at §VII-C. For |X|=2,
this problem can be solved exactly and indeed the optimal
prior is always uniform. This can be seen directly in the cancer
channel above, where the capacity is the maximum value of
1.66a(1−a), where 0≤a≤1, giving a value of 1.66/4 = 0.415.
When |X|>2, however, the optimal prior does not seem to
be uniform in all cases: a graph plotted for the channel
C y1 y2 y3
x1 0.4 0.5 0.1
x2 0.6 0.1 0.3
x3 0.2 0.2 0.6
shows that the optimal additive capacity occurs at approxi-
mately (0.44, 0.09, 0.47).
Finally, let C be the identity matrix on X (i.e. a perfect
channel). Given prior pi:DX, the hyper [pi,C] produced by C
consists of point distributions [x], each one with probability
pix. Now for any x:X the earth-moving distance between pi
and [x] is 1−pix, since all of the mass of pi needs to be moved
onto x, except for what is already there. Hence the overall
earth-moving distance, obtained by considering all x’s in X, is∑
x(amount moved to [x])(distance moved to [x])
=
∑
x pix(1−pix) = 1 −
∑
x(pix)
2 ,
and that is maximized by a uniform pi, giving just 1−1/|X|.
(Interestingly, this is also the maximum additive leakage with
respect to gid.)
IX. Bounding “Dalenius” Leakage
Here we consider the “Dalenius” scenario described in
§V-C, establishing bounds on the leakage of a secret X that
may be caused by a channel C from Y to Z, no matter what
correlations may exist between X and Y . Our results, given in
Cor. 22 and Cor. 23 below, follow from general results that
we now develop for capacities of cascades of channels.
In the following lemmas etc. we assume that channel
R:X→Z is a cascade of channels S :X→Y and T :Y→Z.
The proofs will be presented for additive capacity; but, once
established additively, the results hold easily for multiplicative
capacity as well (Cor. 23).
Lemma 19: Left-capacity bound for cascade For any
prior ρ:DX and gain function g on X we have the inequality
L+g (ρ,R) ≤ L
+
g (ρ, S ).
Proof: This is a direct consequence of properties of a rela-
tion comparing information-flow between channels, described
in recent and related work [7], [11], [23], [37]; it is a partial
order which here we will call “secures.”14 The order has the
property that, for any two channels C,C′, whenever C′ secures
C, we have L+g (pi,C
′)≤L+g (pi,C) for all pi, g (a corollary of [11,
Thm. 6.2 generalised] and of [37, Thm. 8]). Furthermore, and
conveniently for our purposes here, one of several (equivalent)
presentations of that order [11] is as follows:
C′ secures C just when for some conformal channel
M we have C′=CM (with the juxtaposition repre-
senting matrix multiplication, i.e. channel cascade).
Thus we can calculate
R = ST
⇒ R secures S “definition of information-flow order [11]”
⇒ Vg[ρ,R] ≤ Vg[ρ, S ] “ [11, Thm. 6.2], above”
⇒ Vg[ρ,R]−Vg[ρ] ≤ Vg[ρ, S ]−Vg[ρ]
⇒ L+g (ρ,R) ≤ L
+
g (ρ, S ) . “definition L
+
∀
(∀, )”
Lemma 20: Right-capacity bound for cascade For any
prior ρ:DX we have L+
∀
(ρ,R) ≤ L+
∀
(τ,T ), where distribution
τ:DY is the distribution of outputs in Y produced by channel
S with prior ρ.
Proof: Let gain function g on X be arbitrary. We calculate
Vg[ρ,R] .
=
∑
zmaxw
∑
x ρxRx,zg(w, x) “definition V”
=
∑
zmaxw
∑
x ρx(
∑
y S x,yTy,z)g(w, x) “R = ST”
=
∑
zmaxw
∑
y Ty,z
∑
x ρxS x,yg(w, x) “
∑
x
∑
y =
∑
x,y”
= ∑
zmaxw
∑
y Ty,zτyh(w, y)
“define τ, h so that τyh(w, y) =
∑
x ρxS x,yg(w, x)”
= Vh[τ,T ] . “definition V”
The key move obviously is the definition of τ, h in terms
of ρ, g. We use a “temporary” Π:D(X×Y) like this:
Πx,y = ρxS x,y
then τy =
∑
x Πx.y
and h(w, y) =
∑
x Πx,yg(w, x)/τy .
Note that we have that h is 1-spanning, because g is. For each
w there are Lw,Hw with Hw−Lw≤1 and Lw≤g(w, x)≤Hw for all
14In [11], [23] we wrote more-secure ⊑◦ less-secure, by analogy with
refinement of partitions making them less secure. In [7], [37] we wrote
less-secure ⊑ more-secure, since refinement of programs makes them more
secure. This unlucky opposition is why we just call it “secures” here.
x, so that Lw =
∑
x Πx,yLw/τy ≤ h(w, y) ≤
∑
x Πx,yHw/τy = Hw,
from the definition of τy.
Now if you set T=O in the above, 15 then R=SO=O also,
and you get
Vg[ρ] = Vg[ρ,O] = Vh[τ,O] = Vh[τ] ,
so that for any ρ, g there are τ, h with L+g (ρ,R) = L
+
h
(τ,T ).
And so L+
∀
(ρ,R) ≤ L+
∀
(τ,T ) as claimed.
Those two lemmas give us this theorem about cascades:
Theorem 21: Capacity of cascades If R:X→Z is a
cascade of channels S :X→Y and T :Y→Z (as above) then
L+∀(∀,R) ≤ L
+
∀(∀, S ) min L
+
∀(∀,T ) ,
where we recall that L+
∀
(∀, ·) is a supremum over all priors
and all (1-spanning) gain-functions.
Proof: The result follows directly from Lemmas 19,20:
simply take suprema on both sides to give L+
∀
(∀,R) ≤ L+
∀
(∀, S )
and L+
∀
(∀,R) ≤ L+
∀
(∀,T ) respectively.
Now we can use Lem. 20 to give a bound on any “collat-
eral” Dalenius leakage about some other X even when there is
no direct link between C and X, i.e. if we are given only that
there is some interesting joint distribution on X and Y that is
somehow known to the observer.
Corollary 22: Dalenius bound Consider as above a
channel C:Y→Z and let pi:DY a prior for C. Assume further
that there is some other space X and a known joint distribution
Π:D(X×Y) describing a correlation between X and Y. Note
that pi must in that case be the Y-marginal of Π.
Imagine an extended channel C∗ from X×Y to Z defined
by C∗
(x,y),z
= Cy,z. Then (addressing the concern raised in §V-C)
the “collateral leakage” that the imaginary C∗ causes wrt. the
arbitrary X can be bounded independendently of X and the
joint distribution Π it shares with Y. The bound depends only
on C and pi: we have L+
∀
(Π,C∗) ≤ L+
∀
(pi,C), where the right-
hand side –the upper bound– does not depend on X and its
relationship with Y beyond the (necessary) fact that pi is the
Y-marginal of Π.
Proof: Construct a deterministic “projection channel”
P:X×Y→Y so that P(x,y),y′ = (1 if y=y
′ else 0). Observe then
that C∗=PC, that pi is the Y-output of C∗ wrt. prior Π, and
apply Lem. 20.
Note from our conclusion L+
∀
(Π,C∗) ≤ L+
∀
(pi,C) we have
in particular, for any “Y-ignoring” g∗(w, (x, y)) = g(w, x)
encoding an attacker’s interest in X alone (i.e. not in Y at
all), that the bound L+g∗ (Π,C
∗) ≤ L+
∀
(pi,C) applies.
Finally, we note that the same results hold for multiplicative
capacities:
Corollary 23: For channels R:X→Z and S :X→Y and
T :Y→Z, with R=ST , we have
Left-capacity bound Lg(ρ,R) ≤ Lg(ρ, S )
Right-capacity bound L∀(ρ,R) ≤ L∀(τ, S )
Capacity of cascades L∀(∀,R) ≤ L∀(∀, S ) min L∀(∀,T )
Dalenius bound L∀(Π,C
∗) ≤ L∀(pi,C) ,
15Recall that that O is a single-column channel, a right-zero of cascading.
where g, ρ, τ,C∗,Π, pi are as defined above.
Proof: The proofs of Lems. 19,20, of Thm. 21 and of
Cor. 22 hold mutatis mutandis for multiplicative capacities.16
X. Related work
As early as the 1950’s, Shannon himself observed [39]
that “[i]t is hardly expected that a single concept of infor-
mation would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible
applications of [information theory].” In the 90’s, Cachin ad-
vocated [40] that information metrics for security, or entropies,
not only include a way to calculate some numeric value
but also offer an operational interpretation, which describes
what aspect of interest is being quantified. In recent years
various metrics have been proposed for capturing the leakage
of information in different operational scenarios. Work has
been done on Shannon entropy [1], [4], [41]–[45] guessing
entropy [28], [46] and vulnerability or Bayes risk [6], [7], [29].
This plurality of metrics motivated researchers to look for
some essential notion of information that would permeate all
the various notions of entropy. Originally proposed by Lan-
dauer and Redmond [47], the Lattice of Information has been
studied as an underlying algebraic structure for deterministic
channels. And indeed, for deterministic channels, Yasuoka
and Terauchi [18] showed that the orderings on induced by
Shannon entropy, guessing entropy, and vulnerability are all
equivalent, and Malacaria [46] showed that they coincide
with the partition-refinement order in the lattice of partitions
induced by such channels.
However meaningful, these traditional entropies fail to
capture a range of other relevant scenarios of interest, and
the g-leakage framework proposed by Alvim et al. [11], and
McIver el al. [7], models the operational scenario in which
the channel executes by means of gain-functions. Given the
wide range of possible gain functions and contexts, a robust
comparison between channels is made via a strong g-leakage
pre-order, which requires a channel never leak more than
another, for any prior and gain function. It was shown in [7],
[11] that composition refinement is a sufficient condition for
the strong g-leakage pre-order in probabilistic channels. The
converse was proved by McIver et al. [7], [23], so establishing
the complete coincidence between composition refinement
and the strong g-leakage pre-order. Hence that ordering is a
compelling generalization to probabilistic channels of the par-
tition refinement on deterministic channels. Furthermore, [23]
introduces abstract channels, which quotient over the abstract
redundancies of the traditional channel representations. The
authors show that composition refinement is a partial order
on abstract channels, but not on channel matrices, and hence
that the abstraction provides a more adequate representation
for probabilistic systems in general.
Finally, Braun, Chatzikokolakis, and Palamidessi [29] show
that multiplicative and additive min-entropy leakage orderings
are equivalent when comparing two channels on a given prior.
However, when channels are compared with respect to their
capacity (over all priors), multiplicative and additive leakage
can produce inconsistent results.
16In fact the capacity of cascades in the multiplicative case also follows
directly from Theorem 6 of [38] and the Miracle Theorem.
XI. Conclusions and future work
We have studied robustness for leakage measurements by
defining additive- and multiplicative capacities; and we have
argued that both play an important role in assessing the
severity of information flows. Our definitions are based on
the relatively new approach of gain functions, which have
been shown to capture a surprisingly wide range of attacker
scenarios; and the corresponding capacity measurements thus
apply automatically to all of those. Further, we have argued
that robustness of leakage measurements is especially useful
when our knowledge is limited, either about the prior or about
the cost/benefit scenarios of an attacker, or both.
Surprisingly, even in the case of unknown and essentially
unpredictable correlations with apparently unrelated data –the
“Dalenius” scenario– we have been able to contribute novel
limits on the information flow that can result.
Our current definitions of additive capacity use 1-spanning
gain functions; this is primarily due to a 1-Lipschitz condition
associated with the Kantorovich metric [35], [37] and is what
enables our connection of the latter with the additive g-
capacity. In future work we plan to investigate other metrics
which would yield similarly efficient algorithms for computing
capacity, but which could express more conveniently other
notions of leakage (such as that based on Shannon). Finally
we plan to investigate approximation algorithms for L+
∀
(∀,C).
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Appendix
A. Technical lemmas on gain functions (from §IV and §VII)
Lem. 24 shows how to express the vulnerability as a
standard expected value of a function over a hyper, and is
a general result we use repeatedly.
Lemma 24: Let C:X×Y→R be a channel, and g a gain
function and pi a prior. Then we have Vg[pi,C] = E[pi,C]Vg .
Proof: The left-hand side just above is interpreted at (4) as
an expected value on the distribution pY of a random variable
F:Y→R defined F(y) = Vg(pX|y), where the joint distribution
Π wrt. which pY , pX|y are defined is the usual one induced by
channel C’s action on the prior pi.
We want to establish that the construction can equally well
be interpreted as acting on a hyper directly: the [pi,C] on the
right-hand side just above is the hyper defined by Π, and
one way of formulating that hyper is as the push forward
of a function G(y) = pX|y acting on pY , typically written
G∗(pY ). And then the entire right-hand side is the expected
value EG∗(pY )Vg.
Once we observe that F is the functional composition
Vg◦G, the result follows from a general equality relating
expected value and push-forward, that Eδ(A◦B) = EB∗(δ)A.
Further details about hypers and their relation to joint
distributions can be found at [7], [23], [37].
Now we can use standard properties of expected values to
verify our gain function algebra.
Lemma 25: Gain function algebra (§IV) Recall the def-
initions from (5) and (6) in §IV:
g×k(w, x) = g(w, x) × k
g+k(w, x) = g(w, x) + k
g+k@x′ (w, x) = g(w, x) + (k if x=x
′ else 0)
x-Shift Vg+k@x′ [pi,C] = Vg[pi,C] + kpix′
Global Shift Vg+k [pi,C] = Vg[pi,C] + k
Scale Vg×k [pi,C] = k × Vg[pi,C] ,
for k≥0
The general proof strategy for these properties is to use
distribution of addition and multiplication through the expec-
tation operator. Note however that this expectation operator
acts at the level of hypers and therefore most of the proofs are
concerned with translating Vg[pi,C] into that form.
We use 0 in gain function expressions to represent the
gain function that returns the value 0 for all values of w, x.
This allows us to write Vg+k@x′ as Vg + V0 +k@x′ , because the
modification of g to g+k@x′ does not affect the (maximising)
choice of w. Our three proofs are now as follows:
x-Shift:
Vg+k@x′ [pi,C]
= E[pi,C]Vg+k@x′ “Lem. 24”
= E[pi,C](Vg + V0
+k@x′
) “remark above”
= E[pi,C]Vg + E[pi,C]V0
+k@x′
“averaging distributes addition”
= E[pi,C]Vg + kpix′ “E[pi,C]V0+k@x′ =
∑
y kpix′Cx′ ,y
= kpix′
∑
yCx′ ,y = kpix′”
= Vg[pi,C] + kpix′ . “Lem. 24”
Global Shift: This follows from the proof of x-Shift since
a global shift is simply an x-shift for each value of x in X.
Scaling: This follows from observing that Vg×k = kVg when
k>0, and then using the fact that multiplication distributes
through the expectation operator.
The next result Lem. 26 is used for Lem. 14 from §VII.
Lemma 26: 1-spanning implies 1-Lipschitz
If g is 1-spanning then Vg is 1-Lipschitz (wrt KDX), considered
as a function DX→R.
Proof: (Note that the proof does not assume a finite W.)
Fix pi, pi′:DX; define X+={x:X | pix ≥ pi
′
x} and X
−=X \X+.
From
∑
pi =
∑
pi′ = 1 we have∑
x:X+ (pix−pi
′
x) =
∑
x:X− (pi
′
x−pix) = 1/2
∑
x |pix−pi
′
x| = KDX(pi, pi
′).
(10)
Given a guess w:W, we define
g(w,⊤) = max
x
g(w, x) and g(w,⊥) = min
x
g(w, x) ,
and then define the function fw : DX→R as
fw(pi) = Epig(w, ·) =
∑
x pixg(w, x) .
We first show that fw is 1-Lipschitz, as follows:
| fw(pi) − fw(pi
′)|
= |
∑
x(pix−pi
′
x)g(w, x)| “definition of fw”
=
|
∑
x:X+ (pix−pi
′
x)g(w, x) −
∑
x:X− (pi
′
x−pix)g(w, x)|
“rewrite sum”
≤
|
∑
x:X+ (pix−pi
′
x)g(w,⊤) −
∑
x:X− (pi
′
x−pix)g(w,⊥)|
“definition g(w,⊤), g(w,⊥) above”
= KDX(pi, pi
′) |g(w,⊤) − g(w,⊥)| “ (10) ”
≤ KDX(pi, pi
′) . “g is 1-spanning Def. 3”
Now we recall that Vg[pi] = supw fw(pi), and so it remains
only to show that the supremum preserves the 1-Lipschitz
property.
So let F be a set of functionsA→R that are 1-Lipschitz wrt
some metric d on A. We show that F(a) = sup f : F f (a) is also
1-Lipschitz. Fixing a, a′:A, assume wlog that F(a)≥F(a′); we
have
|F(a) − F(a′)|
= sup f f (a) − sup f f (a
′) “definition F; F(a) ≥ F(a′)”
≤ sup f ( f (a) − f (a
′)) “− sup f ′ f
′(a′) ≤ − f (a′)”
≤ sup f | f (a) − f (a
′)|
≤ sup f d(a, a
′) “ f is 1-Lipschitz wrt d”
= d(a, a′) .
B. Calculation of Kantorovich distance from [pi] to [pi,C]
(from §VII-C)
The Manhattan distance between two vectors of equal
dimension (e.g. distributions in DX) is the sum of the non-
negative differences between them in each dimension, by
analogy with the distance needed to travel between two in-
tersections in a city of regular blocks (like Manhattan). Thus
we have
KD2X([pi], [pi,C])
= 1/2
∑
y p(y)(Manhattan distance from pX to pX|y)
= 1/2
∑
y p(y)
∑
x |pX(x) − pX|y(x)|
= 1/2
∑
y p(y)
∑
x |pix − p(x, y)/p(y)|
= 1/2
∑
x,y |pixp(y) − p(x, y)|
= 1/2
∑
x,y pix|p(y) −Cx,y|
= 1/2
∑
x,y pix|Cx,y −
∑
x′ pix′Cx′,y| .
C. Existence of g-function for Thm. 17 (from §VII-B)
Here we show that the g-function quoted in the proof of
Thm. 17 has the property claimed:
∑
x τxg(w, x)
=
∑
x τx(1 + (w(x) −
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′))/2) “definition g”
= (
∑
x τxw(x) −
∑
x τx
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′))/2 + 1 “
∑
x τx = 1”
= (
∑
x τxw(x) −
∑
x′ pix′w(x
′))/2 + 1 “
∑
x τx = 1”
=
∑
x(τx−pix)w(x)/2 + 1 . “rename x
′ to x”
